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We analyze the emergence of large-scale education systems in a setup
where growth is associated with changes in the conﬁguration of the econ-
omy. The model is based on three central elements: ﬁrst, individual
preferences over consumption goods generate changes in the composition
of individual spending as income grows, embodied in Engel curves. Sec-
ond, the production of sophisticated services is intensive in human capital.
Third, investment in human capital by individual households faces bor-
rowing constraints. Our model uses an overlapping generation framework
similar to the one in Galor and Moav (2003). As that paper does, we
also model the incentives that the economic ´ elite may have (collectively)
to accept taxation destined to ﬁnance the education of credit-constrained
workers. In our model this incentive does not necessarily arise from a
complementarity between physical and human capital in manufacturing.
Rather, we emphasize the demand for human-capital-intensive services by
high-income groups. The argument model seems capable to account for
salient features of the development of Latin America in the 19th century,
where, in particular, land-rich countries such as Argentina established
an extensive public education system and a sophisticated service sector
before developing signiﬁcant manufacturing activities.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Explanations for diﬀerences in economic development have traditionally stressed
structural factors, with arguments based on conditions such as the abundance of
1natural resources, the specialization in activities that oﬀer good opportunities
for technical improvements, high savings popensities and large capital formation,
extensive markets or other circumstances that may encourage a faster pace of
technological change (see, among others, Chenery and Syrquin, 1975, Chenery
et al., 1986). More recently, a high rate of human capital accumulation was also
identiﬁes as an important determinant of economic development (see, among
others, Barro 1991; Barro and Lee, 2001; Mankiw et al., 1992 and Lucas, 1988).
Lately, the emphasis has shifted to social factors, and especially to the incentive
eﬀects of institutions and culture (see, among others, North and Thomas, 1973;
North, 1981; Landes, 1998; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2000 and Acemoglu et al.,
2005).
There is clear evidence that incentives (economic, social and political) and
the institutions that contribute to their deﬁnition matter for development. Nev-
ertheless, institutions are inﬂuenced by political and economic structures. In
other words, institutions matter but they are endogenously determined. More-
over, economic rules and constraints may well operate diﬀerently, and generate
diﬀerent outcomes according to the conﬁguration of the economy. Thus, a better
understanding of the process of economic development would require considering
the joint determination of economic structure and social institutions.
Human capital accumulation seems to be a clear example of this interaction
between institutions and structural factors. In a world with imperfect capi-
tal markets, low-income workers are constrained in their private investment in
education. Thus, the nature (and, more starkly, the presence or absence) of
a public school system may critically determine the extent and the evolution
of human capital accumulation. But diﬀerent societies develop diﬀerent school
systems. The social decisions on education are certainly inﬂuenced by broad
political and ideological factors, but they also respond to economic considera-
tions and, therefore, they depend on the structure of the economy, to the extent
that this conditions the matrix of interests of various groups and their relative
inﬂuence. For instance: the perceived returns to education from the perspec-
tive of poliyically powerful groups are likely to be lower in subsistence agrarian
economies than in industrial countries. In turn, changes in a society’s levels
of schooling and literacy would aﬀect the social structure and, perhaps, the
political institutions that determine the educational institutions themselves.
The United States and Canada developed primary education from the colo-
nial time. Instead, and despite being the source of enormous wealth at the time,
the British colonies in the Caribbean basin were very slow to organize schooling
institutions that would serve broad segments of the population. Even the Latin
American countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, which were more progres-
sive in this respect in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, lagged more
than ﬁfty years behind the U.S. and Canada in providing primary schooling and
attaining high levels of literacy. Most of Latin America was unable to achieve
these standards until well into the twentieth century, if then (Mariscal and
Sokoloﬀ, 2000). This timing in establishing public school systems with broad
2coverage correlates with actual level of development in the Americas, but that
does not necessarily imply a direction of causality.
Why some countries invested heavily in the education of the population while
others lagged behind? Galor and Moav (2003) —GM from now on- provide an
interesting explanation: capitalists might ﬁnd optimal to invest in the education
of the labor force. They speciﬁcally model the origin of large-scale systems of
public education, taking into account the incentives that the economic elite may
(collectively) have to accept taxation destined to ﬁnance the education of credit-
constrained workers. Due to the complementarity between physical and human
capital in manufacturing production, the capitalists are prime beneﬁciaries of
the accumulation of skills by the labor force. They can gain from tax-ﬁnancing
the emergence of a public education system as a way to increase the supply of
factors in order to raise the productivity of their assets in existing activities.
The argument seems relevant to North America, but it would have diﬃcul-
ties explaining why Latin America lagged behind, and why some countries of
the region develped educational systems earlier than others. Galor et al. (2005)
extends the analysis in GM by assuming that human skills contribute to increase
the productivity of industrial capital, but provide no beneﬁts for landlords as
such. Then, if landlords have veto power over policies, they can block or delay
the growth of public education (see also Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) for a
complementary explanation). This hypothesis can account for the Latin Amer-
ican delay, but still does not rationalize the intermediate cases of the Southern
Cone, which started as early as in the 1860s to develop an important school-
ing system, with a polity under the dominance of landholders, and well before
they developed a manufacturing sector. In this paper we extend the model in
GM to interpret these experiences. In our model, education emerges in certain
cases as a policy proposed by landlords, who are not necessarily engaged in the
production of manufactured goods, since the demand for these may be wholly
satisﬁed by imports.
Our model also has features in common with traditional models of trade with
multiple factors and goods (see, for example, Leamer, 1987), with a particular
speciﬁcation of three commodities: two tradeable goods (agricultural and in-
dustrial) and services (non-tradeables), and four factors (land, physical capital,
unskilled labor and skilled labor, which are not assumed to be perfect substi-
tutes). In this simple model, we focus on the basic properties of comparative
advantages, ignoring technological change.
The analysis that follows is based on three central elements: First, individ-
ual preferences over consumption goods imply changes in the composition of
individual spending as income grows, embodied in Engel curves. Second, the
production of sophisticated services (which are typically non-tradeable, in oth-
erwise open economies) is intensive in human capital. Third, as it has often been
pointed out in the economic growth literature, investment in human capital by
individual households faces borrowing constraints (see, for example, Banerjee
and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996).
3A key channel in our model is the demand for human-capital-intensive
services of high-income groups. The derived demand for skills that emerges
when the incomes of certain groups of the population become suﬃciently high
emerges in a setup with multiple goods, where consumption preferences are non-
homothetic and ”high quality services ” require the input of educated workers.
We also assume that the quantity and quality of labor are not perfect substi-
tutes. This implies that the number of high-income agents may have strong
eﬀects on how many individuals are subsidized to accumulate human capital.
Thus, the size of the elite, as the group who demands ”sophisticated services
” would have repercussions on the size of the group of educated workers. The
model can then rationalize a link between historical conditions, especially with
regard to the distribution of land, and social choices regarding the scope and
the ﬁnancing of the education system.
The argument presented here seems capable of accounting for some salient
features of the development of the Southern Cone of Latin America in the 19th
century. In particular, land-rich countries such as Argentina established an
extensive public education system and a sophisticated service sector before de-
veloping industrial activities. The rise of education in Argentina in the last half
of that century (associated with the emblematic ﬁgure of President Domingo
Faustino Sarmiento) is widely considered one of the key events in the country’s
history, and it took place when the country clearly had a economy based on agri-
culture. Meanwhile, in other Latin-American countries, where the property of
natural resources was (even) more concentrated than in Argentina, a signiﬁcant
public education system did not appear until much latter, in the 20th century
(see Mariscal and Engermann, 2000). This feature of our analysis matches the
argument in Sokoloﬀ and Engermann (2000), who argued that the greater de-
gree of inequality in Latin America, as compared to North America, played an
important role in explaining the diﬀerent behaviors regarding the establishment
of educational institutions.
The starting point in our analysis is a simple agrarian economy, where the
capital stock is accumulated by landlords, while the rest of the population is in
the subsistence sector. At ﬁrst, even landlords only consume agricultural goods,
although they leave bequests (which is necessary for an interesting dynamics to
arise). In such a setting, there can be early comers to industrialization, that is,
e c o n o m i e sw h i c hg r o wi naw o r l dw i t hn os i g n i ﬁcant supply of industrial goods,
or no signiﬁcant trade in those goods. If the capitalists/landlords accumulate
suﬃcient capital, they will start demanding manufacturing goods which, in this
case, must be locally supplied. In the appendix, we brieﬂy discuss this case,
where a capitalist-ﬁnanced accumulation of human capital can emerge as a way
to supply skilled labor to the industrial sector. The basic framework also may
accoount for instances where, once there is a well-developed international mar-
ket for manufactured goods, labor-abundant economies would start industrial
activities for the world market, even when their income levels are too low to
induce widespread domestic demand for those goods (this case is also discussed
4brieﬂy in the appendix). Instead, in the land-rich economies we concentrate
on, the demand for industrial goods will initially be satisﬁed by imports. Here,
the accumulation of human capital would be triggered by the consumption of
services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our
basic model. In section 3 we analyze the evolution of an agrarian economy and
brieﬂy comment on possible alternative paths that may be followed by economies
of diﬀerent structural conﬁgurations. Section 4 deals with the case where large-
scale educational systems appear in land-rich economies, which have not gone
through a previous stage on industrialization. Conclusions are presented in
section 5.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We use a simple general equilibrium, overlapping generations, framework. At
very low levels of income, agents only consume agricultural goods, and leave
no bequest to their (single) descendant. As income grows, individuals are as-
sumed to start generating bequests and, further on, to diversify their spending
by including manufactured goods, and eventually services, into their consump-
tion basket. Bequests can be used to accumulate physical capital or to ﬁnance
education. Agricultural goods can be produced with a subsistence (labor-only)
technology or with a “capitalist” (land-physical capital) technology. The pro-
duction of manufactured goods uses capital, labor, and labor skills. Agricultural
and industrial goods can be traded abroad. Services are assumed to be non-
tradeable and to be produced by skilled labor, with a technology such that the
quantity of services produced depends linearly on the average skills of the work-
ers involved in production, and non-linearly on their number; it will be assumed
that the amount of services delivered to an individual consumer ”saturates”
when the number of participating workers reaches a certain maximal level.
2.1 The Agents
Agents are divided into several groups, depending on their ownership of factors.
Landowners own land and capital, but, for simplicity, it is assumed that they are
not potential suppliers of labor. Workers receive an homogeneous basic endow-
ment of ”raw skills”; they can become diﬀerentiated by their additional skills
acquired through education.In some cases, workers may own capital.Workers
c a nb ee m p l o y e de o t h e ri nas u b s i s t e n c es ector, or in the labor-using activities
of manufacturing and services.The setup is one of overlapping generations, with
a structure similar to that in GM. Individuals live two periods; each member
of a generation has a single oﬀspring. The agents born in period t receive (al-
ready in that period) a bequest from their parent; this must be non-negative,
but may be zero. The bequest may be taxed; the agent allocates the remaining
5resources to acquire capital or to purchase private education (if he is a worker
and chooses to do so). Assets generate income in the next period. Young agents
do not consume (or, which is equivalent, their consumption is included in that
of their parent). When adults, in period t + 1, the agents of generation t par-
ticipate in production, obtain income, consume, and can transfer a bequest to
their oﬀspring. Then, they leave the scene.
The deﬁnition of preferences is based on the following criteria. At very low
levels of income, adult agents are assumed to consume all their income in agri-
cultural goods, without leaving bequests. There is a threshold beyond which
individuals start to “save for their oﬀspring”, although their consumption basket
still consists only of agricultural goods. This sequence allows the accumulation
of capital in an economy where consumption is purely agricultural. When in-
come exceeds another critical value, the agent consumes industrial goods; when
income is high enough, she also demands services. Regarding the incentive for
leaving a bequest, the individual derives utility directly from the amount of re-
sources transmitted to the oﬀspring, independently of the use of bequest by the
next generation. This implies, in particular, that savings depend only on the
income of the adult agent, and not on the future expected of return on assets1.
Preferences and the associated demand curves have functional speciﬁcations
that depend on the level of income, and are deﬁn e da sv a r i a n t so fS t o n e - G e a r y
functions, with an ordering of the goods which are part of the consumption
basket at diﬀerent levels of income.There are four stages: i) consumption of
agricultural goods (A), only; ii) consumption of A and positive bequests; iii)
consumption of A and industrial (I) goods as well as bequests; iv) consumption
of goods A, I and services (N) and bequests. The transitions from stage to stage
imply changes in the marginal propensity to spend in diﬀerent consumption
goods.
2.1.1 Consumption of Agricultural Goods and No Bequests
In this region, the utility function is simply:
u =l ncA if cA ≤ e cA1
where cA is the consumption of good A of the individual. In this region, the
individual consumption reduces to:
cA = i
with i being the adult-age income in terms of good A.
1This assumption does not greatly aﬀect the qualitative results emphasized in the paper.
However, it may have strong implications in some contexts. In particular, this type of savings
function allows the existence of states where the marginal net product of capital is negative.
Also, initial diﬀerences in endowments may have no eﬀect on steady state consumption, while
that would not happen, say, with standard Euler equations if all agents face the same interest
rate, since the ratio of marginal utilities of any two agents would be conserved over time.
62.1.2 Consumption of Agricultural Goods with a Positive Bequest
After the consumption of good A has reached the ﬁrst threshold:
u =( 1− β)ln(cA − e cA1)+β lnb0 if e cA1 <c A ≤ e cA2 or 0 <b 0 ≤ e b0
2 (1)
where b0 is the bequest2,a n d( e cA2,e b0
2) is the basket with the minimum levels
of consumption of agricultural goods and bequests for which the agents start
diversifying their consumption, and begin to demand industrial goods. It may
be noted that one condition is enough to remain in this stage: the assumption
is that both, cA or b0, must be above their threshold value to induce a transition
to the next stage.
Given the income constraint:
i = cA + b0
the sizes of the bequest and the consumption of the agricultural good in this
region are:
b0 = β(i − e cA1)
and
cA =( 1− β)(i − e cA1)+e cA1
For simplicity, and in order to have demand curves for goods A and bequests
without discontinuous jumps in the transition between this consumption stage
and the next, we will assume that the upper thresholds e cA2,e b0
2 correspond to
the demands at a threshold level of income, e i2.T h a ti s :
e b0
2 = β(e i2 − e cA1)a n de cA2 =( 1− β)(e i2 − e cA1)+e cA1
Furthermore, we will assume that the coeﬃcient of bequests in the utility
function is the same, β, for all the stages in which bequests are positive, implying
that the marginal propensity to save is constant.
2.1.3 Consumption of Industrial and Agricultural Goods
In this stage, when the income exceeds e i2, the agent is assumed to include
industrial goods in the consumption basket. Preferences are now expressed as:
u =( 1 − β)αA3 ln(cA − e cA2)+( 1− β)αI3 lncI + β ln(b0 −e b0
2)
if e cA2 <c A and e b0
2 <b 0 ;a n d cA ≤ e cA3 or b0 ≤ e b0
3 or 0 <c I ≤ e cI3
2In this stage, it is natural to deﬁne the bequest in terms of agricultural goods. The
assumption that utility from bequests depends on their value measured in goods A will be
maintained for the following stages.
7If pI indicates the price of manufactures relative to that of agricultural goods,
bequests and consumption are given by:
b0 = β(i −e i2)+e b0
2
cA = e cA2 +( 1− β)αA3(i −e i2)
pIcI =( 1− β)αI3(i −e i2)
The transition from this stage to the next cannot be speciﬁed as a uniquely
determined threshold level of income in terms of good A,s i n c et h ed e m a n d
for good I (and, therefore, the level of income for which limit e cI3 is reached)
depends on the price pI. This implies that, in general, this speciﬁcation of
preferences will imply a discontinuity in demands-bequests in the passage to
the consumption-of-services stage.
2.1.4 Consumption of Physical Goods and Services
If all three conditions are satisﬁed (cA > e cA3, b0 > e b0
3, e cI > e cI3), the individual
consumes services. These services are produced by workers endowed with human
capital: the utility derived by the individual depends on the number of workers,
n, and their average human capital, h. The consumption of services would be:
cN = hψ(n)
In this application we will assume, for simplicity, that the demand for services
is satisﬁed by the maximal amount of workers e n, above which the function ψ
remains constant; the value ψ(e n) is normalized to e n. The consumer’s spending
on services would be:
pNcN = e nwhh
where wh is the wage per unit of human capital.
Preferences have the form:
u =( 1 −β)αA4 ln(cA−e cA3)+(1−β)αI4 ln(cI−e cI3)+(1−β)αN4 lnh+β ln(b0−e b0
3)
The bequest and the demands for consumer goods are derived from the
expressions:
b0 = β(i − e cA3 − pIcI3 −e b0
3)+e b0
3
cA =( 1− β)αA4(i − e cA3−pIe cI3 −e b0
3)+e cA3
pIcI =( 1− β)αI4(i − e cA3 − pIe cI3 −e b)+pIe cI3
e nwhh =( 1− β)αN4(i − e cA3 − pIe cI3 −e b0
3)
82.2 Technologies and Equilibrium Conditions
As stated above, there are three goods: an agricultural good, A, an industrial
good, I, and a service, N.B o t h A and I can be traded internationally, while
N is by assumption a non-traded good. We will assume that there are no
international capital movements. Therefore, young generations must ﬁnance
physical investment and education with the bequest transferred by the previous
generation. The trade balance is assumed to be zero in every period.
The factors of production are four: raw labor, L, human skills, h, land, T
(in ﬁxed supply) and physical capital, X. In what follows, the emphasis will
be placed on the accumulation of capital in sector A: capital will be (loosely)
interpreted as ”cattle”,a n di d e n t i ﬁed with good A.
Good A can be produced with two technologies3. One of those technologies
( ”subsistence”) is characterized by using only unskilled labor, with constant
return, and generates a quantitys e w of output per unit of employment. While
in operation, this technology induces an elastic supply of labor at that wage4.
An agent with income e w only demands agricultural goods.
The other way of producing agricultural goods is with a technology that uses
land and capital. For simplicity, we suppose that each production unit, owned
by a landlord, must occupy a ﬁxed surface of land, T; the output of that unit
would be:
yA = f(XA)+( 1− δ)XA
where XA is the capital stock used in agriculture (or, in this context, the size
of the herd), which has been carried over from the previous period, while δ is a
ﬁxed depreciation rate.
Human capital (incorporated in skills) is produced through education. For
simplicity, the inputs of this activity are assumed to consist uniquely of good A.
The skills of an individual in period t + 1 are a function of the resources spent
on her education in t:
ht+1 = h(et)
with h0 > 0, h00 < 0.
The third good, N, is some type of urban, relatively sophisticated service,
whose production requires skilled labor. As stated above, from the point of view
of an individual demanding good N, the amount of services consumed depends
3For the purpose of our main discussion, the technology for producing industrial goods need
not be speciﬁed, provided that the international price pI is low enough so as to discourage
production in the land-rich economy. The representation of the industriial sector is brieﬂy
treated in the appendix, where we sketch a model of early industrialization.
4The individuals in this “subsistence” sector do not play an active role in the model, but
they provide a reservoir of workforce (` a la Lewis) which, we will assume, is not exhausted
in the relevant range of variables. In principle, there is no presumption that the wage in
that sector is necessarily very low (although, by assumption,it does not induce a diversiﬁed
consumption). The reservation wage could also be interpreted without changing the model
as the income required to induce inmigration. This representation would be relevant for the
Argentine case of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
9on the number of workers providing those services and their average human
capital:
yN = ψ(n)h
It will be assumed that there are decreasing returns in the quantity n of
service production, and that the function ψ reaches its maximum for a certain
value e n. This implies that, while the supply of services is proportional to the
quality of human capital incorporated in its production, the number of workers
per consumer of services would approach a limit. This representation has im-
portant consequences, since it implies th a t ,i no r d e rt or e d u c et h ep r i c eo ft h e i r
consumption basket, the group that demands services would have an interest in
increasing the skills of, at most, e n workers per consumer.
3 Growth and structural evolution
3.1 An agricultural economy
This case is a small variant of a simple Solow model. In the initial condition, it
is assumed that only good A is produced and consumed. The only non-trivial
outcomes in the economy depend on the decisions made by the landlords on the
l e v e lo fb e q u e s t sa n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,o nt h ef u t u r es i z eo ft h ec a p i t a ls t o c k .
The generation and use of income by a representative landlord (agent A)i s
described by :
iA(X)=f(XA)+( 1− δ)XA = cA
A + bA0
where iA is the income of agent A, cA and bA0
are his consumption and bequests.
The latter, received by the oﬀspring of A can only be used to build up capital for
next period. Then: b0A = X0A, the capital stock available next period. Then,
the dynamics of X will be given by:
XA0 = b0A =m a x [ β(f(XA)+( 1− δ)XA − e cA1),0]
where, as deﬁned in section 2.1.1, e cA1 is the minimum level of consumption
for which bequests are positive. If the productivity of X and/or the initial
capital stock are too low or agents are too inclined to consume (e cA1 high) the
economy gests trapped in a subsistence equilibrium. Otherwise, it will undergo
accumulation. We assume that this is the case.
The economy has a potential steady state at a capital stock X∗
P such that:
(1 − β(1 − δ))X∗
P = β(f(X∗
P) − e cA1)
In Figure 1, we represent how this steady state may arise. There, Id is the
function XA0 = XA,w h i l eIcA = −βe cA1. It is easy to see that the existence of
steady states ensues if the following conditions on the values of the parameters
are fullﬁled:
10• A high value of β .
• A high productivity of XA.
• A low treshold consumption e cA1
The arrows indicate the dynamic pattern of accumulation. Low amounts
of XA lead the economy to the subsistence stage. On the other hand, high
amounts of initial capital will decrease until the high steady state is attained.
Notice, on the other hand, that the lowest steady state, XL is unstable. So,
generically, we will speak only of XH as the steady state X∗
P.
The the demand for industrial goods would arise for a capital stock XI such
that the corresponding income is:
f(XI)+( 1− δ)XI = e cA2 + b0
2





(e cA2 − e cA1)
Landlords will start demanding industrial goods if the saving propensity β
suﬃciently high and the diﬀerence the consumptions thresholds is relatively low
The demand for industrial goods will emerge if XI <X ∗
P (see Figure 1).
If that condtion holds, the behavior regarding consumption and bequests will
change before the potential steady state is reached. In an open economy, the
new demand for manufactures does not necessarily change the conﬁguration of
production: simply, some goods A may be sent abroad to pay for the imports
of I. However, alternatively, it is possible that the economy produces the in-
dustrial goods consumed locally (as if in a closed economy), or, also, it may
happen that manufacturing activities get started ”for exports ” before there
is a domestic demand for the produced goods. These alternative scenarios of
”early industrialization ” are sketched in the Appendix.
Figure 1
114 The rise of public education in a land-rich
economy
An economy with (i) abundant land, (ii) a high price of labor5, (iii) a certain
degree of capital accumulation, which has reached the stage where there is
as i g n i ﬁcant demand for manufactures at a time when industrial goods are
available internationally at low prices, may, instead of developing a sizeable
manufacturing sector, go directly to the production of non-tradeable services.
This would happen if the rate of return to capital in agriculture, if all the capital
stock were allocated to that sector, exceeds the rate of return in manufacturing:
f0(b)+1− δ >r I
In this discussion of a land-rich economy we will assume that the condition
holds.
A young generation of landlords will anticipate a demand for services by its
members if the bequests that they receive are such that their future income as
adults exceeds the corresponding threshold:
f(b)+( 1− δ)b>e cA3 + pIe ccA
I +e b0
3 =e i3(pI)
5That is, a high e w, either because the agricultural sector is suﬃciently productive, or the
relevant supply of labor at the margin comes from immigration, which implies transportation
and settlement costs.
12In order for the consumption of services to emerge, the income of the rep-
resentative landlord must attain the critical level e i3(pI)a tac a p i t a ls t o c kXS
such that XS ≤ X∗∗
P ,w h e r eX∗∗
P is a potential steady state in the dynamics
described by:
X0 = b0 = β(i(X) −e i2)+e b0
2
In Figure 2, we show that a steady state (generically only one) exists only if
β, i0(X) (the marginal productivity of capital) and the constant IcI = e b0
2 − βe i2
are high enough. On the other hand, the transition to the consumption of
services happens if the threshold level of bequests, e b0
3 is low enough.
4.1 The Emergence of Public Education
The demand for services will induce a demand for skills. We assume that the
skills required for the provision of services require some kind of formal education,
and cannot be acquired through other means like on-the-job training. This
implies that there will not be a direct arbitrage between subsistence employment
and working in services: subsistence workers cannot migrate to services without
receiving education. But subsistence workers are credit-constrained and, of
course, in a world where human capital is inalienable, individual landlords will
not have incentives to pay for the education of young workers. This implies that
the only alternative for the would-be consumers (the young landlords) to induce
a given supply of services is to act as a group to provide education, more or less
massively, according to the number of workers required. As in GM, capitalists,
with foresight about their future demands, would accept to be taxed to ﬁnance
education for some workers. Here, the incentive would derive from their desire
to diversify their consumption basket.
By assumption, the services consumed by an individual landlord are repre-
sented as cN = e nh,w h e r ee n is the maximal number of service suppliers per
consumer, and h their average level of skills. It may be noted that the landlord
does not derive utility at the margin from increasing the number of agents that
participate in the supply of services, but only from a higher quality of those
services. Therefore, educated workers will receive retribution only on account
of their skills, so that their income is proportional to their human capital: whh.
Additionally, we assume for the time being that the educated workers who work
in the service sector have low enough incomes so that their spending is only in
agricultural goods, without leaving bequests or diversifying consumption.
Figure 2
13At this stage, government decisions simply reﬂect the interests of the land-
lords, group A. If there is spending in public education, it will be ﬁnanced by a
tax on bequests (a lump-sum transfer from landlords to the government). That
is, at this stage, taxes directly reduce the accumulation of physical capital.
Since e n service workers are demanded per landlord, public education will
cover the corresponding number of individuals. For a “per student” spending
in education of size e, the disposable income and the budget constraint of the
representative landlord will be:
iA = f(b − e ne)+( 1− δ)(b − e ne)=cA
A + pIcI + e nwhh + b0
where b−e ne represents the after- tax bequests, which equal the amount of cap-
ital purchased by the landlords, and e nwhh is the spending on services of the
representative landlord, with wh the wage per unit of skills. The notation cA
A
indicates the consumption of agricultural goods of landlords (it may be recalled
here that the skilled workers demand agricultural goods produced in the capital-
ist, non-subsistence sector). In the case of the consumption of industrial goods
and services and the transmission of bequests, those indices are redundant here,
since such variables are non-zero only for landlords.
The market demands of agent A are:
cA
A = e cA3 +( 1− β)αA4(iA −e i3)
pIcI = pIe cI3 +( 1− β)αI4(iA −e i3)
e nwhh =( 1− β)αN4(iA −e i3)
14This last equation implies that, provided e n workers receive education, their
total income depends negatively on the per-capita spending in education, e,
because the aggregate value of spending in services depends positively on the
income of group A, with falls with the size of the tax on bequests.
The bequests left by this generation of landlords will be:
b = e b0
3 + β(iA −e i3)
Proposition 1 The supply of education is determined by:
(1 − (1 − β)αN4)(f0(b − e ne)+1− δ)=whh0(e)
Proof: The planner has to choose e to maximize the utility of agent A subject
to the restrictions given by the demands of the agent and to h = h(e):
uA =( 1−β)[αA4 ln(cA
A −e cA3)+αI4 ln(cA
I −e cA3)+αN4 lne nh(e)]+β ln(bA0 −e b0
3)
This utility can be rewritten as:
vA = κA +( 1−(1 −β)αN4)ln(iA −e i3)+(1−β)αN4 lne nh(e)−(1−β)αI4 lnpI
Using the deﬁnition of iA, the problem of the planner reduces to:
−e n(1 − (1 − β)αN4)
1
iA −e i3




Which, recalling the expression for the demand for services e nwhh becomes the
desired result. 2
The intuition of this result is simple. Given that wh is the marginal valuation
of the skills of qualiﬁed workers, the value of an additional unit of education-per-
worker is e nwhh0, since the extra spending on education will allow to educate the
maximal amount of workers for each consumer, e n. In order to produce those
skills, the representative landlord must reduce his capital accumulation by e n
units of goods. But the opportunity cost for the landlord group is smaller than
the agricultural output foregone: a reduction of this output does not reduce
one-to-one the consumption cA
A, because the fall in the value of spending in
services diminishes the income and the consumption of agents h. T h i si sw h y
the condition that determines the value of e implies a pro-education bias, with
respect to the solution that simply equates the marginal returns to investment
15in both sectors (whh0 = f0(b− e ne)+1− δ). Another way of viewing this result
is that, when increasing the supply of skills, all the additional services to be
produced will be consumed by the A group, while an increase in the output of
agricultural goods will be shared between agents A and h, because the latter
will beneﬁt from a rise in the value of spending on services.
To summarize:
Lemma 1 The dynamics of the system are determined by:
• Income of agents A:
iA = f(b − e ne)+( 1− δ)(b − e ne)
• Demand for services:
e nwhh(e)=( 1− β)αN4(iA −e i3)
• Supply of services (or allocation of bequests):
whh0(e)=( 1− (1 − β)αI4)(f0(b − e ne)+1− δ)
• Dynamics of bequests:
bA0 = e b0
3 + β(iA −e i3)
Proof: Results from the characterizations in section 2. 2
The dynamics of the wages of skilled labor are important, in particular, to
analyze the supply conditions of manufactured goods and, thus, the potential for
industrialization after an agriculture-plus-services stage. As it can be seen, the
accumulation of capital raises both the supply and the demand for h.B u tt h e
magnitude of the shifts depends on the technologies in education and agriculture,
represented by the functions h and f. The wage would tend to decline if the
growth of human capital is fast relative to that of physical capital, and that
would depend on the intensity of decreasing returns on both types of investment.
It would seem more or less intuitive that, at ﬁrst, the demand for services, and
indirectly for skills, would start from a low level, and both wh and h would be
small. The wage would then increase as the demand for services grows. If the
productivity of education falls less quickly than the productivity of investment
in sector A, then at some point the wage would decrease, as investment gets
increasingly directed towards education.
In any case, the total spending in services and, therefore, the income of the
e n educated workers would increase monotonically with the income of group A
and, consequently, with the output of the agricultural good.
164.2 Moving Ahead: Brief Comments on Subsequent
Phases
When the economy has a signiﬁcant size of educated population, as capital
accumulation proceeds, it is likely that both the conﬁguration of output and
spending, and the determinants of public policies will continue to evolve. Here,
we will only mention brieﬂy, and in mostly qualitative terms, some alternative
paths that may be followed.
Possible Emergence of Manufacturing It is possible that, at some point,
the eﬀect of decreasing returns in the primary goods sector and an expansion of
the supply of skills may result in the emergence of a manufacturing sector6.T h i s
may also occur if, for some reason, the international price of industrial goods
increases relative to those of agricultural commodities. Then, capital would ﬂow
to manufacturing. This would change the political economy in several ways.
One issue would be whether (as assumed in the exercises in the appendix)
landlords ”transform ” themselves into entrepreneurs with interests in both
traded sectors, or whether they are lenders of resources to a new group of
industrial entrepreneurs (the division of the ´ elite has been an often mentioned
feature of resource-based economies with an incipient industrialization). Also, it
is probable that the group of educated workers start to gain political inﬂuence:
with the emergence of manufacturing, they would have ”mixed ” interests as
suppliers of services, as workers in the manufacturing sector and, if their income
is suﬃcient, as consumers of industrial goods. In addition, the inﬂow of workers
from the subsistence sector to the (mainly urban) industrial sector may also
create a new signiﬁcant group of inﬂuence, with interests in raising the demand
for industrial labor. That conﬁguration is likely to generate an interesting (and
complicated) dynamics of policies (especially in terms of industrial protection
and the spending in education) and capital accumulation.
Public and Private Education With or without the appearance of manu-
facturing, if the accumulation of capital in the agricultural sector grows enough,
at some point the e n skilled workers may start to leave bequests. Their young
descendants would then use some of their resources to acquire assets. One may
consider two cases: (i) one where, for some reason, the educated individuals
can only invest in private education (which would be the case, say, if there was
no organized market where they can invest in agricultural capital, or lend to
landowners), and (ii) one where there is a credit market in which agents trade
assets. It may be assumed, for example, that public education is ﬁnanced by
a tax on bequests, at the same rate for both groups, and that at this stage
6A pertinent question for this discussion would be whether human capital has a ”multi-
purpose ” feature, or it would tend to be sector speciﬁc. Another important (and not easy
to specify) characteristic of the economy would be the shape of the production function of
education, since it would inﬂuence the path of the wages of skilled labor.
17the political economy changes so that now the government contemplates the
ihnterests of skilled workers (group H) with some weight.
Intuitively, if there is no capital market, the tax on H is irrelevant from the
point of view of agent A, since in this setting, the bequest is going anyway (by
assumption) to be used entirely to purchase education. Individuals of group H
would want that the income (and, of course, the spending) of A be as large as
possible (as long as they are educated so as to belong to the group of service
suppliers). Also, from the point of view of the representative H agent, a purchase
of private education by the group would not raise income, since it lowers the
price of services in proportion to the human capital which is generated. Then,
it may be expected that, if the weight of agents H in the planner’s preference is
zero, the condition that determines the allocation of bequests between education
and physical capital will be the same as in the case where skilled workers do
not save. That is: the A planner would reduce one-to-one the expenditure in
public education as the private investment of the group H increases (although,
the pro-education bias would remain, for the reasons stated above). Curiously,
perhaps, it would seem that the addition of individuals H in the planners’s
preferences would tend to reduce the expenditures on public education: the
already established skilled workers H favor a low tax rate, since the tax on the
bequests of landlords reduces the demand for their services.
If there is no restriction on lending by group H, the situation would change.
Two additional considerations arise here: (i) the planner has to recognize that
the tax level and the investment in education of skilled workers are linked
through an arbitrage between lending and acquiring human capital, and (ii)
the skilled workers are now creditors and, in that position, they gain from high
interest rates, and then from a low capital stock in agriculture. The problem
now appears quite complicated. In particular, while in the case without ﬁnan-
cial savings the interests of group H were consistent with the maximization of
the income of landlords in order to increase the demand for their services, now
this is partially oﬀset by the impact on their revenue as lenders. In any case,
these brief comments suggest that, in an economy such as that described, the
provision of education may give rise to non-trivial political games.
Diversiﬁed Consumption of Skilled Workers If skilled workers get rich
enough in the process of capital accumulation, they would start to diversify
their consumption basket. However, the appearance of a demand for industrial,
tradeable goods by that group does vary noticeably the pattern of evolution:
the economy will become more open as demand shifts from locally produced
agricultural goods to imported manufactures, without much change elsewhere.
T h ec a s ew o u l db ed i ﬀerent if the wage of skilled workers rises to the point
where they also demand services. There would then be a “secondary ” demand
for skills (and for new skilled workers), on the part of the agents who previously
were selling services to landlords/capitalists. From a modeling perspective, this
18would pose questions about the treatment of the production of services as a
function of the quantity and quality of labor employed (or, concretely, about
whether each “incumbent ” skilled worker now demands e n new workers for his
consumption of services). This would have implications on how large would
be the growth of the pool of educated workers. Also, the incentives of policy-
makers change. Intuitively, an A planner, for example, recognizes that there are
no “exclusive” goods any more, consumed only by landords. An increment in
the supply of skills would also beneﬁt the educated workers as consumers. The
provision of public education would be discouraged accordingly, from the point
of view of landlords. However, the A planner would likewise internalize the fact
that a lower supply of skills increases the wage of educated workers, and raises
their demand for services, which would crowd out the demand by landlords.
The two eﬀects would be weighed when considering taxation and spending in
education.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a model that can rationalize diﬀerent patterns in the emer-
gence of educational systems, in a way that can be pertinent in accounting for
contrasts between the experiences of countries in the American continent in the
19th century. As a representation of economic development, at this stage the
range of validity of the model is limited by the fact that we disregard phenom-
ena like capital movements and, especially, technical change which, of course,
should be central elements in a more general analysis. However, as it is the
m o d e ls e e m su s e f u lt oh i g h l i g h td i ﬀerent motives for the ´ elite to ﬁnance the
education of low-income workers.
The model focuses on the demand for human-capital-intensive services of
high-income groups. This channel can generate a demand for education, and
appears because we adopt a setup with multiple goods, where consumption
preferences are non-homothetic and the demand for skill-intensive commodities
emerges at comparatively high levels of income. We also assume that the quan-
tity and quality of labor are not perfect substitutes; consequently, the number
of high-income agents may have strong eﬀects on how many individuals are
subsidized to accumulate human capital.
We have tried to represent some aspects of the interaction between the be-
havior of private agents, the changes in the economic structure and the sequence
of policy choices. The resulting model can describe diﬀerent types of economic
evolution without necessarily relying on exogenous political factors as the only
cause of the divergence of economic performances. Since institutions are clearly
a crucial determinant of economic behavior, the eventual aim would be to rep-
resent their co-evolution with the economic and social structures.
Several kinds of economies, with diﬀerent qualitative behaviors, could be
identiﬁed. The ﬁrst kind is that of early comers to industrialization. These are
19economies where, in the process of capital accumulation, agricultural produc-
tivity is high enough to generate a widespread demand for manufactured goods,
which must be produced internally. The growth of the agricultural-industrial
economy (with a bias towards industry, due to the higher income elasticity of the
demand for the corresponding goods) may lead to the emergence of a demand
for skills.
A second class of economies are those which are well endowed with labor, and
where agricultural productivity is not enough to trigger industrialization ”for the
domestic market”, but can engage in labor intensive manufacturing for exports
if and when an international market for those goods develop. In this basic setup,
we merely refer to the ﬁrst steps of industrialization for these economies. Further
work should certainly consider with more detail the processes of technical change
and the increase in the supply and demand for human capital in production:
here, it should be expected that education relates more or less directly with the
requirements of an international-market-oriented manufacturing sector.
Our focus was on resource-abundant economies where income growth is such
that a large demand for industrial goods appears at a time when the supply by
early comers is already well developed. Straightforward comparative advantage
implies that those economies will import manufactures. If the demand for ”so-
phisticated” services starts for incomes above a certain threshold, increases in
the value of the output of primary goods can imply that, at some moment, a
demand for skilled labor may appear in order to satisfy that consumption by
high-income groups. These groups, then, would not oppose the emergence of
public education to increase the skills of a set of workers, the number of which
would depend on the number of landlords who demand services. Hence, the dif-
fusion of education would depend on the size of the elite and, indirectly, on the
degree of concentration of land ownership. The growth of an educated class can
change the political balance, and the incentives to provide public education,
by incorporating into the picture a new inﬂuential group, and also by giving
rise to a population who in some cases may self-ﬁnance the acquisition of skills
of descendants. A large manufacturing activity may or may not arise ”sponta-
neously”. Over time, a new political economy of industrial protection is likely to
result from the interplay of the interests of landlord, capitalists, skilled workers
(at ﬁrst, mainly occupied in services), and unskilled workers, if they participate
in political decisions. Quite diﬀerent paths seem possible according to how the
implicit conﬂicts are processed.
The model we have presented was inspired in part by the Argentine ex-
perience, where a strong public education movement appeared well before the
demand for skills in manufacturing acquired some importance. Of course, the
political decision to make substantial investments in education had a number
of motives, and cannot be simply attributed to the wish to ”lower the costs of
services for the landlords”. Clearly, the desire to integrate immigrants to the
national society and, in general, to promote ”civilization” (a much cited and
discussed concept at the time) played a very large role. However, training a
20large number of individuals for ”civilized life” presupposes, at least implicitly,
the expectation that the resulting skills will ﬁnd demand in ”civilized jobs”. In
fact, for several decades, the newly educated workers were readily absorbed in
a growing economy and, particularly, in the service sector.
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7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Early industrialization: a preliminary sketch of an ar-
gument
Consider an economy that accumulates agricultural capital before there is a
signiﬁcant international supply of industrial goods. If capital accumulation pro-
ceeds to the point where landlords start demanding industrial goods, they must
be produced locally since the economy is closed for all practical matters. Then,
it is clear that production would diversify into manufacturing as a result of
the new composition of consumption demands. Thus, if and when the income
of landlords reaches the threshold where their consumption diversiﬁes, there
would be a shift of capital into manufacturing, and the dynamics would change
compared with the agricultural stage. Now, the logic of capital-skills comple-
mentarity would apply. With certain technologies, manufacturing skills may
be acquired through on-the-job training (apprenticeship), at some point, the
provision of public education may be in the interest of capitalists, and the GM
argument would apply.
However, once the early-comers to industrialization have engaged in that
path, the economies that lag behind in capital accumulation need not follow the
22same sequence: once there is an active international market where manufactures
trade for primary goods, the late-comers may industrialize “prematurely ”, or
alternatively, become producers of services for high-income groups without ﬁrst
developing manufactures. Regarding the ﬁrst possibility, standard international
trade arguments indicate that an economy with suitable factor endowments
can produce industrial goods for the world market, independently of domestic
consumption. This would be more likely if landlords are suﬃciently frugal and
entrepreneurial while agriculture is not-too-productive (which speeds up the
arrival of the moment where investment in manufacturing becomes proﬁtable
at the margin relative to accumulating agricultural capital) and there is a large
supply of labor capable of moving from a subsistence sector to manufactures (` a
la Lewis). Also here the provision of education would be likely to be predicated
on a perceived demand for more skilled industrial workers.
We refer to those two cases of industrialization in the sketch that follows.
The new assumptions are:
Industrial goods are produced with unskilled labor, skills, and physical cap-
ital:
yI = g(LI,XI,h I)
where LI is the number of workers employed used in manufacturing, XI is the
amount of capital used in sector I and hI the average skill of the work applied
in the industry. That is: each worker carries his basic (unskilled) labor force
enhanced by h units of acquired skills. We postulate a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
yI = γI(LI)ρL(hI)ρH(XI)ρX
We assume that ρL + ρX = 1, i.e. that output grows in proportion to the
input of capital and labor at any ﬁxed level of skills. If production depends only
on the aggregate amount of skills (eﬀective labor)t h e nρL = ρH; however, we will
suppose that there is a proper contribution of unskilled labor, so that ρL > ρH.
Each ”uneducated ”worker is assumed to carry a basic level of skills h0 for
potential use in sector I. If the wage of a worker with skills h in manufacturing
is w+whh (where w would be the return on zero-skilled labor, and wh the return
per unit skill), we will assume that there is an elastic supply of uneducated
workers at wage e w. In turn, if there is an active manufacturing sector, in the
relevant range, wages in that sector for a worker with h0 skills do not exceed
e w at a level of employment that would occupy the entire pool of subsistence
workers.
7.2 Export-led industrialization
This case would represent an economy which, with suitable factor endowments,
produces good I for the world market, even without a widespread consumption
23of that good. Given the speciﬁcation of the production function and the as-
sumption that uneducated labor is supplied elastically at wage e w,a n da s s u m i n g
that capital is perfectly mobile between sectors, if h0 > 0 is the level of skills
of workers without education for the purpose of working in manufacturing, we
have that:
Proposition 2 Capital X is allocated to sector I if
f0(X∗
P)+1− δ ≤ rI(pI, e w,h0)
where rI is the value of the marginal product of capital in manufacturing if the
amounts of capital and labor are determined optimally, given that the (inter-
national) price of the industrial good is pI, the (subsistence) wage is e w,a n d
labor has the basic (zero-education) level of skills h0. If that condition is satis-
ﬁed, by continuity, the equality would hold for a level of the total capital stock
e XI <X ∗
P.,w h e r eX∗
P, as in the text, is the capital stock at steady state that
would be attained in a purely agricultural economy. Here, e XI indicates the min-
imal level of capital accumulation for which manufacturing production would
start.
The above condition means that, when the total capital stock is that of
the potential steady state of an agricultural economy, the return to capital
in manufacturing exceeds the return to capital in agriculture. This will be
more easily satisﬁed with low subsistence wages, not-too-productive agriculture
and frugal capitalists; of course high productivity and/or high prices of good I
tend induce production.It may be noted that, here, by assumption, the skills of
workers are ﬁxed at h0, and the manufacturing industry faces an elastic supply of
labor such that the wage of an uneducated worker is: w+whh0 = e w. Therefore,
given thre parameter h0,the rate of return to capital in manufacturing would be
a function only of the subsistence wage in terms of the industrial good.
Then , if and when the total capital stock reaches the threshold e XI cap-
ital would move into manufacturing. Assuming for simplicity that capital-
ists/landlords will not or cannot buy education and there is no public education
for credit constrained workers, that only agricultural goods are consumed and
that the return on labor skills does not induce saving by workers, the system is
described by:
iK = f(XA)+( 1− δ)XA +( X − XA)r
f0(XA)+1− δ = r = rI(pI, e w,h0)
b0K = βiK − e cA1 = X0 = X0A + X0I
The ﬁrst equation deﬁnes the income of the capitalists (agents K,w h oa r e
a tt h es a m et i m e)a st h eo u t p u to ft h ea g r i c u l t u r a ls e c t o rp l u st h er e t u r no n
24capital invested in manufacturing. The second equation speciﬁes the equilibrium
allocation of the capital inherited from the previous generation and the rate of
return. The third group of equations establishes the bequest, and speciﬁes that
it must be used to install future capital, denoted X0 in both sectors.
The system determines the evolution of the aggregate and sectoral capital
stocks. It can be seen that, as long as there is a reservoir of workers, and there
is no education, the rate of return in manufacturing stays constant. In this
process of industrialization, all additional capital goes to sector I and industrial
employment increases by drawing workers from the subsistence sector at a con-
stant capital-labor ratio. This is clearly a result ”` al aL e w i s ” .
We can study the evolution of wages. As stated before, if the wage of a worker
with skills h is given by w + whh, the arbitrage condition with subsistence em-
ployment implies e w = w + whh0, assuming that the supply of non-educated
labor is elastic. Then, if manufacturing starts production, equilibrium in the
supply and demand of skills implies that:






In order to analyze the potential demand for education, it matters to con-
sider how the main variables respond to changes in the supply of skills.
Lemma 2 For a given level of skills, h, the demands for labor and skills in























25• Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 1. 2
Consider now the existence of a social planner representing the capitalist-
landlord agents (K). In analogy with the presentation in Galor and Moav
(2003), the planner may tax agents K (the agents who leave bequests) in order
to ﬁnance public education. Here, it should be stressed, the planner would only
have an interest in educating the L agents who will work in industry I (and not
the whole pool of subsistence workers). That is: the expenditure in education
would be:
E = Le = XIl(h(e))e
where e i st h ec o s to fe d u c a t i o np e rw o r k e ra n dl the labor/capital ratio, which
depends on h. The allocation of resources would be driven by the maximiza-
tion of the total returns to agents K derived from agriculture and industrial
activities.






Proof: The objectives of the planner are represented by the following maximiza-
tion problem;
max f(XA)+( 1− δ)XA + rI(h(e))XI
subject to
XA + XI + XIl(h(e))e = b
and
f0(XA)+1− δ = rI(h(e))
The solution yields the condition on returns. 2
The intuition is that a marginal increase in the skills per worker increases
the unit return to industrial capital, but lowers investment in sector I by the
direct impact of the expenditure, given the ﬁxed amount of bequests, while
the transfer of capital from agriculture operates in the opposite direction. The
measure of the opportunity cost takes into account that an increase in h aﬀects
education expenditures by modifying the demand for labor, and thus the number
of individuals to be educated. It may be expected that the level of education
a n da c q u i r e ds k i l l si n c r e a s e sw i t hc a pital accumulation. The economy would
then go through a phase of growing incorporation of workers to industry, who
w o u l db ee d u c a t e di nt h ep r o c e s s . T h eg r o w t hi nw a g e si nm a n u f a c t u r i n gm a y
induce at some point savings by the workers, and dilute their diﬀerence with
the capitalists. However, a full “demise of the class structure ” (GM) does not
seem a necessary result.
267.3 Early industrialization for the domestic market
The discussion in the previous exercise assumed that the price pI was determined
in the international market. But, if there is no developed world market (or the
country is the ”ﬁrst comer ”), industrial goods cannot be purchased abroad, but
must be produced internally when the demand arises. Production diversiﬁes in
parallel with consumption.
The economy would now be described by the following equations:
• Demand for industrial goods:
pIyI =( 1 − β)αI3(iK −e i2)
where the notation is as before, and iK is the income of the land-
lord/capitalists.
• Income of agents K:
iK = f(XA)+( 1− δ)XA + rI(pI, e w,h)XI
where, as before, XA,XI are the capital stocks in each sector, rI the rate
of return of capital in manufacturing, and h the average level of skills of
the labor force in I.
• Supply of good I.
yI = yI(pI,e w,h)
• Allocation of capital:
f0(XA)+1− δ = rI(pI, e w,h)
• Employment in manufacturing:
L = XIl(pI,e w,h)
• Allocation of bequests
b = XA + XI + Le
where the possibility of allocating resources to education has been consid-
ered.
• Supply of skills:
h = h(e)
• Dynamics of bequests
b0 = β(iK −e i2)+e b0
2
The system can be completed by specifying the choices on education, which
could be determined, as before, by a government that optimimizes on behalf of
group K.
27